Permanent Replacements, Presidential Power, and Politics: Judicial Overreaching in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich by Kimmett, Charles Thomas
Permanent Replacements, Presidential Power,
and Politics: Judicial Overreaching in
Chamber of Commerce v. Reich
Charles Thomas Kimmett
One of the most contentious decisions an employer can make during a
labor dispute is to replace striking workers permanently. When striking
Greyhound workers were permanently replaced by their employer, replacement
bus drivers and bus riders became the targets of sniper fire.' As expected,
customer use of Greyhound buses significantly declined in those areas in which
buses had been targeted, and Greyhound quickly discovered that replacements
were unwilling to drive those routes.2 Similarly, the Hormel Company's
decision to hire permanent striker replacements was accompanied by such
violence that Minnesota Governor Rudy Perpich called in the National Guard
to quell the unrest.
3
Strikers' willingness to resort to violence is due largely to the fact that
permanent replacements represent an immediate, long-term threat to their
future livelihood. Such violence cannot be condoned, but the tangible effect on
those who contract with the firm employing the replacements must be
recognized. The external effects of an employer's decision to hire permanent
replacements raise even more significant concerns when the federal
government is contracting with the struck business. The prospect of the
government's being unable to fulfill its obligations, especially in times of crisis
or national emergency, would suggest that it should be allowed to protect its
interests when employers with which it contracts are involved in contentious
strikes involving permanent replacements.4
On March 8, 1995, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12,954,
designed to bar the federal government from contracting with employers who
1. See James Bovard, Union Goons' Best Friend.... WALL ST 1. June 2. 1994. at A14
2. See id.
3. See Michael H. LeRoy, The Mackay Radio Doctrine of Permanent Striker Replacements and the
Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act: Questions of Preemption. 77 MIss. L. REv 843. 844 (1993)
4. Noting how receiving goods from companies using permanent replacements could ha~e a negative
effect on quality, Labor Secretary Robert Reich stated. -We don't want American scr' ice men and women
in Bosnia trying to keep the peace while driving around on tires made by rookies and replacement
workers."' Toni Locy, Court Strikes Down Replacement Worker Order. WASIf. PosT. Fcb 3. 1996. at A 12
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permanently replace striking workers during the course of a labor dispute. 5
The purpose of the Order was to protect the federal government's "economy,
efficiency, and cost of operations" by promoting stable relationships between
those businesses contracting with the federal government and their
employees.6 The Order referred specifically to overarching problems that
accompany an employer's decision to use permanent replacements. First, it
stated that using such replacements exacerbates labor disputes, resulting in
longer and more contentious strikes.7 Second, it asserted that by using
permanent replacements, employers often lose the "accumulated knowledge,
experience, skill, and expertise" of the replaced employees to the detriment of
the federal government with which the employer has contracted.8
By barring those contracting with the federal government from using
permanent replacements during a labor dispute, the Order attempted to protect
the proprietary interest of the federal government. Under the Procurement
Act,9 the President has the power to issue executive orders dealing with
federal contracting to protect the government's proprietary interest as a
contracting party. Although the stated purpose of the Order was to protect the
government's proprietary interest, its implementation was the focus of much
partisan criticism, largely because of the controversial nature of permanent
replacements. 0 Recent studies have indicated that strikes in which employers
use permanent replacements last longer and are more contentious than strikes
in which no such replacements are used." By issuing the Order, the Clinton
Administration made a policy choice-it chose to accept the rationale that the
use of permanent replacements was a cause, rather than a result, of unstable
labor relations-and took action to restrict the use of such replacements by
those contracting with the government. Such a choice undeniably had political
overtones. Although the stated purpose of the Order was to protect the
government's proprietary interest, it also was an attempt by President Clinton
to curry favor with labor interests.'
2
5. See Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995). This Note will refer to this document as
"Order" throughout the text.
6. Id. at 13,023.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. See Federal Property Management Improvement Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. § 486 (1994).
10. See Asra Q. Nomani, Clinton Bans Use of Firms That Replace Strikers; GOP and Business Vow
Battle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1995, at A5.
11. See John F. Schnell & Cynthia L. Gramm, The Empirical Relations Between Employers' Striker
Replacement Strategies and Strike Duration, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 189 (1994).
12. Labor interests traditionally have been major contributors to Democratic presidential campaigns
and dedicated substantial resources to Clinton's reelection campaign. See Phil Kuntz, GOP Launches
Counterattack Against Labor For Its Bid to Help Democrats Recapture Congress, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20,
1996, at A12; see also Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12
LAB. LAW. 117, 120 (1996) ("Admittedly, the Clinton Administration owed a considerable political debt
to organized labor .... "). However, as an ardent supporter of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Clinton provoked the ire of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO), which was against its passage. See Clinton Targets Firms' Use of Striker
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The controversy surrounding the use of permanent replacements can be
traced back to the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)."3 In
1935, the Supreme Court upheld the NLRA,'" which protected employees'
right to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activities.'5
The right to strike is one of the most important concerted activities in which
employees can participate and is specifically mentioned in section 13 of the
NLRA: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein,
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike .... t6
Although the NLRA presents a strong congressional statement in support
of an undiminished right to strike, the Supreme Court qualified this right in
1938. In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,"7 the Court stated: "[The
employer] is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers,
upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, in order to create
places for them."' s It is this dictum' 9 that has become the basis for
subsequent Court decisions recognizing an employer's right to replace striking
workers permanently.20 The fact that the NLRA is silent on the issue of
permanent replacements and explicit in its protection of the employees' right
to strike has been the basis for much criticism of the Mackay doctrine?2'
Replacements, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995. at A22; Noman. supra note 10. In light of the presidential
campaign, it is doubtful that Clinton did not consider the fact that issuing the Order would help garner
labor's support in the 1996 election. See Nomani, supra note 10. In reference to the Order. Republican
challenger Senator Bob Dole stated, "iLet me just lay it out cold. This is all about politics, nothing to do
with workers or anybody else. It's all about 1996 and President Clinton trying to shore up his base-*-
Robert Reno, 'Politics' is Dole's New Verbal Crutch. STAR-LEDGER (Newark). Mar. 19. 1995. at I
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
14. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937) (upholding National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. 33 151-69).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
16. Id. § 163.
17. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
18. Id. at 345-46 (footnote omitted).
19. See William D. Turner, Restoring Balance to Collective Bargaining Prohibiting Discrimmation
Against Economic Strikers, 96 NV. VA. L. REv. 685, 690 (1994) (calling section of decision regarding
permanent replacements "bald and wholly unsupported dicta"); Jack J. Canzonen. Comment. Managements
Attitudes and the Need for the Workplace Fairness Act. 41 BuFF. L. REv. 205, 213 (1993) ("Despite the
fact that this language was mere dictum, it has endured as controlling law to this very day and has been
elevated to the status of doctrine, albeit a doctrine which legal scholars ... have strongly cnticized.").
20. The judicial construction of the right to replace striking workers permanently is not itself without
limits. See, e.g., Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off. Tune It Out. 25 U.S.F. L REv 295. 300-02
(1991); infra Section I.C. For example, employees who are stmking in protest of an employer's unfair labor
practice are protected from being permanently replaced, and in such cases the employer must reinstate
striking workers upon their request for reinstatement. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB. 350 U.S. 270,
278 (1956).
21. See, e.g., LeRoy, supra note 3, at 849 ("Mackay Radio's approval of the hiring of permanent
replacements is plainly at odds with the NLRA's prohibition against judicial construcuon that diminishes
the right to strike."); Pollitt, supra note 20, at 296 ("[The Mackay] dictum has evolved today into an
albatross that so burdens employees' exercise of the right to strike that it seriously undermines effective
collective bargaining."); Canzoneri, supra note 19, at 215 ("Since management's use of permanent
replacements does impede and diminish the statutory right to strike, the argument that the Mackay doctrine
undermines the intent of the NLRA is justifiable.").
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Recently, employers have more readily resorted to the use of permanent
replacements as a means of maintaining operations during labor disputes and
breaking a strike.22 This has prompted labor to prioritize the passage of a
federal anti-replacement law.23 The most recent legislative attempt to overrule
the Mackay dicta was the Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act, which passed
in the House of Representatives, but was defeated in the Senate by a
Republican-led filibuster in 1994.24 In the wake of the defeat of this Act,
President Clinton issued the Order, thus affirming a prolabor policy with
regard to the controversial striker replacement doctrine.'
This policy choice did not go uncontested. A number of probusiness
interests,26 led by the Chamber of Commerce, challenged the validity of the
Order in federal court and claimed that, by interfering with an employer's right
to hire permanent replacements, the Order violated the National Labor
Relations Act.27 In Chamber of Commerce v. Reich,25 the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the Order.29 In doing so,
the court noted that there was "undeniably ... some tension between the
22. See Michael H. LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements: Empirical
Analysis of NLRA and RLA Strikes 1935-1991, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 169, 176 (1995)
(attributing employers' increased use of permanent replacements in past 20 years to factors including high
unemployment rates and employer retainment of labor consultants who teach legal strike-breaking
techniques). Many scholars attribute the rise in the use of permanent replacements to the "union-busting"
attitude of the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, particularly Reagan's decision to replace striking air
traffic controllers permanently. See, e.g., Pollitt, supra note 20, at 307; Turner, supra note 19, at 695-97.
LeRoy, however, argues that the rise in the use of permanent replacements can be traced back to 1975, and
that Reagan's replacement of the air traffic controllers was not the catalyst for the increase. See LeRoy,
supra, at 175-76. For anecdotal examples of the ease with which employers have used Mackay dicta to
replace striking workers permanently, see THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 231-36
(1991).
23. See Turner, supra note 19, at 687; Kevin G. Salwen, Ban on Replacing Strikers Seen Facing Bleak
Future as House Prepares to Vote, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A2.
24. See Canzoneri, supra note 19, at 206; Asra Q. Nomani, Senate Ban on Permanent Replacement
of Strikers Is Stalled, in Labor Defeat, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1994, at A2. A previous bill offered during
the Bush Administration that would have banned the hiring of permanent replacements met with the same
fate. See Peter M. Leibold, Labor Legislation in the 104th Congress: Follow the Money, 12 LAB. LAW. 137,
152-53 & n.127 (1996).
25. See Nomani, supra note 10.
26. These included the Chamber of Commerce, the American Trucking Associations, Inc., the Labor
Policy Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., and Mosler, Inc.
See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
27. See id. at 1332 ("Appellants' most powerful argument on the merits, it strikes us, is their claim
that the Executive Order is in conflict with the NLRA.").
28. 74 F.3d 1322.
29. See id. at 1339. The Clinton Administration initially promised "'to take all appropriate steps to
have [the Reich] decision overturned."' Court Rules Clinton Erred on Labor Issue, STAR-LEDGER (Newark),
Feb. 3, 1996, at I (quoting President Clinton); see also Glenn Burkins, Clinton Seeks to Reinstate His
Order Penalizing Employers of Strike-Breakers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A16. Despite this promise,
it ultimately decided not to appeal the Reich decision to the United States Supreme Court. See Clinton
Abandons Bid to Enforce 1995 Order Guarding Strikers' Jobs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1996, at A24; Peter
Szekely, White House Abandons Legal Effort Against Companies that Replace Strikers, STAR-LDGER
(Newark), Sept. 10, 1996, at 9. An anonymous administration official explained this decision stating,
"'There was some concern that a negative ruling from the Supreme Court could have very far-reaching
implications on any president's authority to issue executive orders."' Szekely, supra.
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President's Executive Order and the NLRA"3 and held that the Order was
preempted by the NLRA. 3' The court also concluded that the Order was
"regulatory in nature," and, as such, an impermissible use of the President's
executive order powers. 2
This Note will argue that Reich was an example of judicial overreaching
for three reasons. First, the court paid undue deference to the dicta of NLRB
v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.33 The Reich court treated Mackay as if it
were explicit statutory text and failed to acknowledge the limitations placed on
it by Congress and the Supreme Court. Second, the court improperly extended
the preemption doctrine developed in Lodge 76, Interniational Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission- to the acts of
the President of the United States.35 Not only was such action unprecedented,
but it was also contrary to the Supreme Court's recent trend toward limiting
the Machinists preemption doctrine.36 Third, the court refused to recognize
the fact that the scope of the Order fell within the government's proprietary
interest as defined in the Supreme Court's recent Boston Harbor decision
37
and, as such, was a legitimate exercise of the executive order power within the
realm of labor relations.
I. THE EXTRAORDINARY ELEVATION OF MACKAY
In Reich, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Order as
implemented by the Secretary's regulations "promise[d] a direct conflict with
the NLRA. '38 It stated that the NLRA is "a statute that delegates no authority
to the President to interfere with an employer's right to hire permanent
replacements during a lawful strike. ' 39 According to the court, the Order
altered "the delicate balance of bargaining and economic power that the NLRA
establishes." ° The NLRA, however, does not explicitly address an
employer's use of permanent replacements; instead, the right to replace
workers permanently is derived from dicta contained in the Mackay decision
30. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1333.
31. See idL at 1339.
32. See id.
33. 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
34. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
35. The Machinists preemption doctrine restricts states from regulating the choice of economic
weapons used by employers and unions in the course of a labor dispute. See id. at 144. In Machinists. the
Court held that in passing the NLRA, "'Congress meant to leave some activities unregulated and to be
controlled by the free play of economic forces." Id.
36. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983); infra Part 11.
37. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors. Inc.. 507 U.S. 218
(1993). This case is commonly referred to by courts and commentators as the Boston Harbor decision and
shall be referred to as such throughout the text of this Note.
38. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322. 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
39. Id. at 1332.
40. Id. at 1337.
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of 1938. By stating that the NLRA delegated no authority to the President to
address the issue of permanent replacements, the court misrepresented the
issue.
This Part presents three arguments in critique of the Reich decision. First,
the court mistakenly characterized the Order as an attempted repeal by
implication. The court supported this characterization by elevating the dicta of
Mackay to the level of explicit statutory text. Because the NLRA is silent on
the issue of permanent replacements, the court, in order to reach its conclusion,
had to treat the dicta of Mackay as though it were the actual text of the NLRA.
Second, the court failed to take note of specific provisions of the Order that
serve to limit its scope so that it does not entirely eliminate an employer's
replacement rights. Third, the court, in unduly deferring to the Mackay dicta,
failed to acknowledge the existence of statutory and judicial limitations on the
employer's right to use replacement workers.
A. The "Repeal by Implication" Argument
In any analysis of the Order, there are two major statutes that must be
addressed: the Procurement Act, which gives the President the power to issue
executive orders for the purpose of preserving the economy and efficiency of
the federal government,4 and the NLRA, which regulates labor-management
relations. 42 The court reasoned that since the NLRA addresses labor policy
more specifically than the Procurement Act, the NLRA is controlling absent
express congressional intent in the Procurement Act to repeal the NLRA's
striker replacement doctrine. In making this analogy, the court failed to
mention the fact that the specific statute-the NLRA-does not address the
issue of permanent replacements.43
In Morton v. Mancari,44 the Supreme Court set forth three general rules
addressing the issue of repeals by implication. First, the Court restated the
"'cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are not favored."'' 45 Second, it
stated that "[i]n the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to
repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the
earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.4 6 Third, the court ruled that
"[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be
controlled or nullified by a general one."'4 7
41. See 40 U.S.C. § 486 (1994).
42. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
43. See infra Section I.C.
44. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
45. Id. at 549 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 550-51.
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An application of the general rules of Mancari to the Order does not
require its invalidation. First, the Order does not violate the rule against
implied repeals. As discussed below, 8 the specific provisions of the Order
do not prohibit the use of permanent replacements by an employer. They only
disallow federal government contracting with the employer during the labor
dispute in which permanent replacements are used.4 9 Second, the Order and
the Mackay doctrine are not irreconcilable. The Order merely places a limit
upon an employer's use of permanent replacements,50 in that by using
permanent replacements during a labor dispute, the employer forgoes the
opportunity to enter into government contracts. An employer is still free to
choose to use such replacements.5' Finally, using the terms of Mancari, the
Order cannot be considered a general statute.52 It specifically addresses the
use of permanent replacements, 3 the resulting injury to the government as a
contracting party,-" and the processes by which termination and debarment
of an employer using replacements will take place." The Order is, in fact,
akin to a specific statute designed to protect the government's proprietary
interest,56 and it can coexist with an employer's right to hire permanent
replacements. It does not represent control by a general statute over a specific
statute.
B. The Specific Provisions of Executive Order 12,954
In arguing that the Order is inconsistent with the NLRA as interpreted by
Mackay, the court does not address the specific provisions of the Order. These
provisions are tailored to protect the government's proprietary interest, to limit
48. See infra Section I.B.
49. See Permanent Replacement of Lawfully Striking Employees by Federal Contractors. 60 Fed. Reg
27,856, at 27,862 (1995); infra Subsection I.B.l.
50. Limits on the use of permanent replacements are not unusual There have been both lcgislative
enactments and judicial decisions that have limited their use. See infra Section IC
51. Cf. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104. 109 (1991) (stating that repeals
by implication are disfavored when two statutes are capable of coexistence because of value of harmonizing
different statutes and constraining judicial discretion).
52. The Order, like the Mackay doctrine, is not a statute. Because the NLRA and the Procurement Act
are both silent on the issue of permanent replacements, the proper "statutory" analogy for the purposes of
a repeal by implication argument should be drawn between the Order and the judicial interpretation of the
NLRA found in Mackay.
53. See Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13.023 (1995).
54. See iL
55. See id.; see also Permanent Replacement of Lawfully Sinking Employees by Federal Contractors.
60 Fed. Reg. 27,856, at 27,861-62 (1995) (Secretary of Labor's final implementation regulations)
56. In other cases involving executive orders passed under the power of the Procurement Act. courts
have held that such orders were akin to a statutory enactment. See Farkas v. Texas Instrument. Inc.. 375
F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating executive order 'is to be accorded the force and effect given to a
statute enacted by Congress"); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.. 329 F2d 3. 7 (3d Cir 1964) (stating that
executive orders, regulations, and rules issued under power of Procurement Act "'hase the force and effect
of laws"). For a general discussion on the historical use of executive orders issued under the authority of
the Procurement Act, see American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations v Kahn.
618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane).
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debarment to the length of the labor dispute, and to allow for case-by-case,
discretionary application of the Order. As such, the Order need not be read as
inherently inconsistent with an employer's discretion to use permanent
replacements.
1. Debarment Limited to Length of Labor Dispute
The Order does not, by its terms, prevent an employer from hiring
permanent replacement workers. It simply protects the government's
proprietary interest by limiting its contracting to employers with stable labor
relationships.57 The Order is specifically tailored to prevent the government
from contracting with employers using permanent replacements during the
course of the labor dispute in which such replacements are used. It provides:
"[T]he debarment will not extend beyond the date when the labor dispute
precipitating the permanent replacement of lawfully striking employees has
been resolved ....,5 Once the labor dispute is resolved, the employer is no
longer debarred from receiving government contracts, even if permanent
replacements continue to be employed.59
The Secretary of Labor is vested with the authority to determine when the
labor dispute has been resolved.60 Although an employer cannot contract with
the federal government while involved in. a labor dispute during which
permanent replacements are used, the employer's debarment-the time during
which it cannot contract with the federal government-is specifically limited
to the time period during which the labor dispute is unresolved. Unilateral
reinstatement of all striking employees is not a condition precedent to an
employer's removal from the debarment list.
In many labor disputes in which permanent replacements are used, it is
common for the dispute to be resolved by an agreement between the parties
that does not require the unilateral reinstatement of all replaced workers. 6' In
fact, cases subsequent to Mackay have stated that the reinstatement of
57. See infra Part III.
58. 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,862 (emphasis added).
59. Cf. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
In Gould, the Court struck down a state statute debarring state agencies from contracting with repeat NLRA
violators for a period of three years. This automatic, "rigid" period of debarment was a factor mentioned
by the Court in determining that the statute was "on its face" an enforcement provision. See id. at 287. By
contrast, the terms of the Order require that the employer no longer be debarred once the labor dispute is
resolved. Debarment under the Order is thus limited to the time during which the government's proprietary
interest is specifically threatened.
60. Section 270.16 of the Order's implementation regulations specifically lists factors to be considered
by the Assistant Secretary of Labor in making this determination. These include: (1) whether the parties
have reached a formal settlement; (2) whether the parties have agreed informally to end the dispute; (3)
whether the striking employees have returned to work; and (4) any other relevant factors tending to lead
to the conclusion that the dispute has ended. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,862.
61. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426,
430-31 (1989) (discussing post-strike situation in which permanent replacements retained their positions
and former strikers were reinstated as vacancies occurred).
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employees may or may not be a precondition to ending the labor dispute.62
Thus, labor disputes may be concluded without reinstatement of all strikers.
The Order does not condition an employer's eligibility to receive government
contracts on the reinstatement of striking workers, but rather on the resolution
of the labor dispute. As such, the Order is limited to protecting the government
as a contracting party from harms related to a labor dispute, and does not
impermissibly regulate the employer's use of permanent replacements.63
Those opposed to the Order might argue that there exists within the
marketplace a subset of employers who are almost entirely dependent upon
government contracts for their livelihood, and that the Order places such
employers in a no-win situation: either hire permanent replacements during a
strike and lose their primary source of income, or avoid a strike by submitting
to the union's demands. Such an argument necessarily assumes that there are
not sufficient alternative methods of maintaining business operations during a
strike other than hiring permanent replacements. Employers, however, do have
other options. Such options include continuing operations using labor from
nonstrikers and supervisory personnel, hiring outside contractors to perform the
struck tasks, stockpiling inventory in anticipation of a strike, and hiring
temporary replacements.64 As to the viability of using temporary
replacements, some commentators suggest that employers are generally able
to attract a sufficient number of employees to remain operational during a
strike even when they offer only temporary employment.6  Other
62. See id. at 438-39.
63. As with any administrative structure in which a government agency or employee is givcn discretion
in making an important factual determination, the Order grants authority to the Secretary of Labor to decide
whether or not a labor dispute has indeed ended. Cf Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor. 442 F2d 159.
175 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that courts ought to give "more than ordinary deference" to administrative
agency's interpretation of executive order): Farkas v. Texas Instrument. Inc.. 375 F2d 629. 632 n 2 (5th
Cir. 1967) (noting that enforcement of nondiscrimination provisions in government contracts have
historically been entrusted to governmental agencies with assistance of presidential commiitee) It is
possible that, based on the policy of a specific administration or Secretary. the determinaion of the time
at which a dispute has actually ended could be either postponed or brought forwsard This is an mevitable
result of the administrative process. However, some checks exist on the possibility that a Secretary wsould
unfairly extend the time period during which a labor dispute is considered to exist. First. the Order does
provide for a process by which debarred employers can petition the government to challenge their
debarment. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. Second. the government agencies that are denied
contracting with a particular employer during the course of a labor dispute also have the ability to challenge
a debarment. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. Third. the political process provides a check upon
routine overextension of debarment time periods. Should a particular administration construe the definition
of labor dispute too broadly to the chagrin of business interests, such interests could challenge the
administration in the political process. Finally, if it appears that the Secretary is acting in an arbitrary or
capricious manner in extending the time period of debarment, an employer could challenge such a
determination in court.
64. See Hal Keith Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessitn. 50 TEX. L.
REv. 782, 790-91 (1972); Jeffrey A. Spector, Comment. Replacement and Reinstatement of Strikers in the
United States, Great Britain, and Canada, 13 ComP. LAB. L. 184, 200-01 (1992).
65. See Canzoneri. supra note 19, at 232; see also William Feldesman. Dictum Carned to Extrrmes"
Mackay Radio Revisited, 12 LAB. LAw. 197, 203-04 (1996) (describing examples of temporary replacement
availability and existence of market providing temporary replacements to struck cmployers); Jonathan P
Hiatt & Lee W. Jackson, Union Survival Strategies for the Twenty-First Cenir.. 12 LAB. LAw. 165. 167
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commentators have argued that, even if an employer would find it difficult to
hire a sufficient number of replacements without offering them permanent
status, the Mackay doctrine should not be the default rule. Instead, the burden
of proof ought to be placed upon the employer, who would be required to
justify the necessity of using permanent replacements in a given situation.
6
There are a number of factors suggesting that employers are able to attract
temporary replacements. First, although in the past higher unionization rates
resulted in moral stigmatization of workers willing to replace strikers, 67 today
approximately ten percent of private sector employees are unionized.6 8 As a
result, employers have less reason to offer replacements permanent status to
overcome a replacement worker's moral concerns.6 9 Second, even when
employers have made an offer of "permanent" employment to a replacement,
such replacements have often lost their positions once the employer and union
settled the labor dispute. 70 Thus it is unclear how much significance can be
(1996) (describing means available to employers for hiring "peripheral" workers, including use of temporary
help agencies, employee leasing firms, and service contractors). The availability of temporary work is not
limited to unskilled jobs. A market for professional temporary workers such as lawyers, nurses, and writers
also exists. See Hiatt & Jackson, supra, at 171-72.
66. See William R. Corbett, A Proposal for Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent Striker
Replacements: "A Far Far Better Thing'" than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C. L. REV. 813, 876-77
(1994); Deborah Eberts, Comment, The Mackay Doctrine: The Grand Dame of Labor Law Clashes with
Current State of Union, 57 J. AIR L. & COM. 257, 284 (1991); Note, One Strike and You're Out? Creating
an Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine, 106 HARV. L. REV. 669, 682-83 (1993).
67. See Gillespie, supra note 64, at 789 (arguing that employers might find it difficult to hire
replacements in pro-union communities); Charles E. Wilson, The Replacement of Lawful Economic Strikers
in the Public Sector in Ohio, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 639, 652 n.99 (1985) (same).
68. See Estreicher, supra note 12, at 117 ("From a highpoint in the mid-1950s-when unions
represented over 35 percent of workers in private firms ... -the unionization rate has plummeted to under
12 percent of the private sector workforce."); Frank Swoboda & Martha M. Hamilton, Labor Looks to
Grow from the Grass Roots, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1996, at HI (noting decline in private sector
unionization rate from peak of approximately one-third of workforce to only 10% today).
69. See Gillespie, supra note 64, at 792. I use the term "moral concerns" since anti-replacement
propaganda traditionally painted a decision to replace another worker as immoral and repugnant. See Old
Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (discussing use of "scab" as anti-replacement
epithet). The Old Dominion decision quoted a piece of trade union literature commonly attributed to Jack
London which concludes: "[A] SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family, and his class." Id. at
268. One commentator has suggested that today younger workers who have never belonged to a union are
more likely to replace strikers: "We call them 'scabs,' but they are just being realists. They read The
Tribune looking for strikes as if they were want ads. In the old days they wouldn't scab, because they'd
hope one day to be in a union, too. But labor's dying now, or its dead .... GEOGHEGAN, supra note 22,
at 233; see also Estreicher, supra note 12, at 118 ("American workers bom after World War I1 are less
inclined to favor collective and statist solutions ....").
70. Despite receiving an offer for permanent employment, a replacement is still subject to discharge
if a collective bargaining agreement requires that replacements be discharged. See Sean J. O'Sullivan, Note,
Protecting the Expectation of Permanent Replacements: When May an Employer Limit the Seniority Rights
of Striking Employees?, 5 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 109, 112 (1987). To appease a union, employers may also
discharge replacements before the settlement of a strike. See id. Thus the offer of permanency can be
illusory. See Gillespie, supra note 64, at 790. Replacements often know of these factors and understand
that, despite being promised a permanent position, their offers were nonpermanent in that they are subject
to dismissal. See Samuel Estreicher, Collective Bargaining or "Collective Begging"?: Reflections on
Antistrikebreaker Legislation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 577, 604 n. 110 (1994); Anthony G. Moleski, Comment,




accorded an offer of permanent employment.7
Any contractor who loses a federal government contract because of the
Order will likely argue that if he or she is not allowed to offer permanent
positions to replacements, there will be insufficient interest in the temporary
jobs. As a result, the contractor will argue that the business will be severely
affected. However, there is another response to the contractor who is solely
reliant upon federal government contracts: No one has a right to a federal
contract. In American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial
Organizations v. Kahn,2 the D.C. Circuit addressed the mandatory nature of
a compliance program instituted by an executive order. That order had been
issued under the authority of the Procurement Act and had denied federal
government contracts to companies that failed or refused to comply with
certain voluntary wage and price standards." In upholding the validity of this
order, the court stated:
Further, any alleged mandatory character of the procurement
program is belied by the principle that no one has a right to a
Government contract. As the Supreme Court ruled in Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., "[T]he Government enjoys the unrestricted
power ... to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the
terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases."
Those wishing to do business with the Government must meet the
Government's terms; others need not.74
Although Clinton's Order may impose some costs on federal contractors,
especially on those who rely solely upon federal contracts for their livelihood,
such are the costs of doing business with the government. Since the Order has
been publicly issued and its guidelines, as interpreted by the Secretary of
Labor, have been publicly promulgated,75 government contractors have had
full knowledge of these potential costs. Those contractors who believe such
costs are prohibitive or who do not wish to be subject to the terms of the
Order can choose not to contract with the federal government.
7 6
71. But see Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983) (allowing replaceincnts who were offered
permanent status and then subsequently fired when strikers rctumed to bnng suits in state court against
employer). Belknap suggests that, even if replacement employees cannot rely upon an offer of pcrmancnt
employment actually resulting in permanent employment, they could have a nght of action against an
employer who offered them permanent status. However, the costs of pursuing such an action could be
prohibitively high in practice.
72. 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
73. See id. at 785-86.
74. Id. at 794 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor.
442 F.2d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 1971) ('The prospective contractors may either agree to undertake the (tcrms
of executive order at issue], or forego bidding on federally assisted work.").
75. See Exec. Order 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995); Permanent Replacemeni of Lawfully Sinking
Employees by Federal Contractors, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,856, at 27.860-62 (1995) (final implementation
regulations promulgated by Secretary of Labor).
76. See Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Treatment of Permanently Replaced Strikers. 1935-1991 Public
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2. Discretionary Element of the Order
The Executive Order also allows for discretion in the termination of a
contract with an employer using permanent replacements during a labor
dispute.77 It implements procedures that permit flexibility and promote
decentralized decisionmaking by placing the power to veto a contract
termination or employer debarment with individual department heads.78 In
addition, the Order requires that the Assistant Secretary notify the employer of
any proposed termination or debarment and give the employer an opportunity
to submit arguments and attend a hearing in order to contest such action.79
These discretionary checks prevent a rigid application of the Order when such
an application would be harmful to the government's interests.
C. Qualifying the Use of Replacement Workers
The Reich court stated: "It is... undisputed that the NLRA preserves to
employers the right to permanently replace economic strikers as an offset to
the employees' right to strike." 80 In support of this statement, the court noted
that "It]he [Supreme] Court has repeatedly approved and reaffirmed Mackay
Radio.' This assertion by the court cannot be denied; ever since the Mackay
decision, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the use of permanent
replacements, and Congress has never explicitly overruled it. It is also true,
however, that neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has allowed employers
an unfettered right to replace striking workers. The Reich court did not
recognize limits on an employer's right to replace workers in its decision, and,
as such, implied that the Order represented an unprecedented interference with
this right. This Section develops an analysis that acknowledges the limitations
of the Mackay doctrine, thereby presenting a more balanced view of the striker
replacement doctrine's evolution. Under this analysis, the Order appears less
as an aberration and more as an acceptable action by the executive.
Policy Implications, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 24-25 (1995).
77. In Wisconsin Department of Industrial, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
the Court struck down a Wisconsin statute which debarred repeat violators of the NLRA from doing
business with the state. Among the factors noted by the Court in striking this statute were "the rigid and
undiscriminating manner in which the statute operates" and the fact that the statute "automatically
deprive[s]" firms from competing for the state's business. Id. at 287-88. The Executive Order at issue in
Reich does not involve automatic termination or debarment.
78. Section 270.14 of the implementation regulations provides that once the Assistant Secretary of
Labor makes a finding that an employer is using permanent replacements, he or she must notify the head
of any department or agency that contracts with the employer. If the head of the department or agency
objects to the termination of this contract and notifies the Assistant Secretary of this objection, the contract
will not be terminated. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,861.
79. See id. The Assistant Secretary is given the discretion to decide not to terminate or debar the
employer based on the record of the hearing. See id.




1. Congressional Action Regarding Striker Replacements
One of the strongest arguments in support of the Reich decision is that
Congress has repeatedly rejected recent attempts to overturn the
Mackay doctrine. Although Congress has been relatively silent in legislating
directly in the area of permanent replacements, it has implicitly recognized the
existence of the striker replacement doctrine by not using its plenary power to
overrule it explicitly by statute. Congress has, by contrast, passed legislation
addressing and limiting an employer's use of replacements.
The most obvious statutory provision limiting the use of permanent
replacements is the NLRA itself, which, as noted previously, protects the
employee right of concerted activity and specifically protects the right to
strike.82 Yet, as stated above, Congress has never acknowledged an
inconsistency between the NLRA and the Mackay doctrine. To be sure, if the
Mackay doctrine were in direct contravention of congressional intent, Congress
could have taken some action within the past fifty-eight years to reconcile the
inconsistency. The lack of explicit congressional action repealing the Mackay
doctrine lends credence to the Reich court's decision.
In addition to the language in the NLRA, however, there are three other
statutory provisions that touch, at least indirectly, on the employer's right to
use replacements. These are the Targeted Jobs Credit section of the Internal
Revenue Code,83 the Byrnes Act of 1936,84 and the Wagner-Peyser Act of
1933.85 Although none of these acts repeals an employer's right to replace
striking workers, each recognizes limitations of this right.
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Act allows employers to receive a tax credit
for forty percent of "qualified" first-year wages in a given year. 16 Wages are
qualified if they are "paid or incurred by the employer during the taxable year
to individuals who are members of a targeted group.,17 However, this section
specifically eliminates from this category wages paid to employees who are
performing work that is substantially the same or similar to the work
performed by currently striking or locked-out employees.n Thus the wages
82. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157. 163 (1994); supra note 21
83. 26 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1994).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 49(j)(b) (1994).
86. See 26 U.S.C. § 51(a) (1994).
87. Id. § 51(b)(1). The targeted groups are defined in § 51(d).
88. See id. § 51(c)(3). The statute reads:
(3) Payments for services during labor disputes.
If-
(A) the principal place of employment of an individual with the employer is at a
plant or facility, and
(B) there is a strike or lockout involving employees at such plant or facility.
the term "wages" shall not include any amount paid or incurred by the employer to such indizdual
for services which are the same as, or substantially similar to. those services performed by employees
participating in, or affected by, the strike or lockout during the period of such stike or lockout.
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paid to replacement workers during the course of a labor dispute do not qualify
for tax credits under the Act. This Act signals a legislative willingness to
withdraw benefits from employers using replacements. In doing so, Congress
essentially taxes employers for using replacements. Both the Targeted Jobs Tax
Credit Act and the Order, though enacted after Mackay, impose a cost on an
employer's use of permanent replacements.
There is also statutory evidence of Congress's sensitivity to the issue of
"strikebreakers '89 which predates the Mackay doctrine. The Byrnes Act
criminalizes the transportation across state lines of strikebreakers who are
brought to the labor dispute for the purpose of forcibly obstructing or
interfering with employees' self-organization or picketing rights.9" In addition,
the Wagner-Peyser Act requires the Secretary of Labor to provide notice to job
applicants of any strikes or lockouts at a workplace before referring them for
employment there.9' Both acts illustrate a congressional awareness of
problems accompanying the use of strikebreakers. Although both acts predate
the Mackay decision, they remain valid law despite the fact that they qualify
an employer's right to use replacements. Hence, Congress has set implicit
limits on the striker replacement doctrine.
2. Judicial Interpretations and Limitations
By stating that the Supreme Court has "repeatedly approved and reaffirmed
Mackay Radio, 92 the Reich court oversimplifies the complex development
of the Mackay doctrine. The court is correct in stating that, since Mackay, the
Supreme Court has indeed recognized an employer's right to hire permanent
replacements.93 In noting the acceptance of Mackay while failing to
acknowledge judicial limitations of that decision, the Reich court painted the
Order as steadfastly contrary to Supreme Court precedent. A deeper analysis
of Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Mackay reveals a less than
wholehearted acceptance of the Mackay doctrine.
In Mackay, the Court placed a limit upon an employer's use of
replacements by holding that the discriminatory reinstatement of workers at the
conclusion of the strike based on their union activity was an unfair labor
89. Replacements, both permanent and temporary, have been referred to by a number of names,
including "strikebreakers" and "scabs." See supra note 69.
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1994). The Byrnes Act is titled "Transportation of strikebreakers" and
imposes a punishment of a fine or up to two years' imprisonment on anyone who transports persons for
the purpose of obstructing or interfering by force with a labor dispute. See id.
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 49(j)(b) (1994). The section is titled "notice of strikes and lockouts to applicants."
Id.
92. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
93. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990); Trans World Airlines,




practice.94 At the conclusion of a strike, employers are not permitted to pick
and choose based on union animus or activity among employees applying for
reinstatement.95 In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.,9 the Supreme Court
held that the employer was required to rehire permanently replaced workers
preferentially if positions became available after the conclusion of the strike.
This requirement to rehire replaced strikers before other applicants extends
even beyond the date on which the strikers initially request reinstatement."s
In Fleetwood Trailer, the Court concluded that there were only two legitimate
business justifications for not reinstating a striker: if the job were filled by a
permanent replacement, or if the job had been eliminated for substantial and
bona fide reasons. 99 In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,"' the Court created
a distinction between unfair labor practice strikes (in which employees strike
to protest illegal employer actions) and economic strikes (in which employees
strike to achieve objectives such as increased pay and more benefits). Unlike
an economic strike, at the conclusion of an unfair labor practice strike the
employer is required to reinstate all previously striking employees who would
like to return-even if "permanent" replacements have been hired."0' The
right to replace workers was further limited in NLRB vi Erie Resistor
Corp.,102 in which the Court struck down an employer's grant of twenty
years of unearned seniority credit to replacement workers and crossover
employees. 0 3 The Court held that the employer had engaged in an unfair
94. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.. 304 U.S. 333. 346-47 (1938)
95. See id.; see also George Banta Co. v. NLRB. 686 F2d 10. 21 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating rule that
strikers are entitled to "reinstatement without discrimination on the basis of relati'e union acti tty").
Newbery Energy Corp., 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1307. 1310 (1976) (ordcnng that any discharged striker
improperly denied reinstatement be paid back pay plus interest).
96. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
97. See id. at 380-81; Augusta Bakery Corp.. 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1028 (1990) (holding that
employer violated NLRA by refusing to reinstate former stokers).
98. See Fleetwood Trailer, 389 U.S. at 380-81.
99. See id. at 379; see also Laidlaw Corp., 68 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1252 (1968) (holding economic
strikers to be entitled to reinstatement in their prestrike jobs absent legitimate and substantial busiess
justification). The Fleenvood Trailer Court also held that considerations relating to labor relations %ere not
to be considered bona fide reasons for not reinstating a striker. See Fleen'ood Trailer. 389 U S at 379
Interestingly, the Court has never applied the bona fide reason test to the initial decision to hire permanent
replacements. For a discussion of the merits of amending the NLRA to create a rebuttable presumption that
employers have "no legitimate business necessity" to hire permanent replacement %orkers, see Note. supra
note 66, at 682.
100. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
101. See id at 278; see also NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48. 76 (1972) (calling unfair
labor practice strikers' right to unconditional reinstatement "well settled"); NLRB v Harding Glass Co.
80 F.3d 7, 10 n.3 (lst Cir. 1996) (stating that "[ulnfair labor practice strikers are entitled to unconditional
reinstatement" absent contractual or statutory provision to the contrary); Hoffman v. Polycast Tech. Div.
79 F.3d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1996) (emphasizing obligation to reinstate strikers dependent on whether strke
protested unfair labor practice or economic conditions); Gibson Greetings. Inc. v. NLRB. 53 F3d 385. 389
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating unfair labor practice striker who unconditionally offers to return to work is entitled
to reinstatement); F.L. Thorpe & Co., 148 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1055, 1060 (1994) (holding failure to reinstate
unfair labor practice strikers to be violation of NLRA).
102. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
103. See id. at 235-36. Crossover employees are employees at the time the strike commences who
choose not to honor the picket line and resume work despite the existence of the strike.
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labor practice by giving this significant seniority bonus to nonstriking and
replacement employees. As such, the Erie Resistor decision placed limits on
preferential treatment of replacement workers or crossover employees by
employers. 104
3. The Order Is Analogous to Other Limitations
The Reich court is correct in acknowledging that the Supreme Court and
Congress have accepted an employer's right to replace striking workers. If the
intent of the Order was to eliminate this right entirely, the Reich decision
would be justified. Employers are legally entitled to replace workers so long
as Congress fails to repeal the Mackay doctrine by explicit statute.
However, the Order does not prohibit an employer's use of permanent
replacements. It instead in effect requires employers to make an economic
decision weighing the value of using permanent replacements versus the
potential loss of government contracts during the time of the labor dispute. As
will be discussed below, the government has asserted legitimate proprietary
interests for not contracting with employers utilizing permanent
replacements.0 5 Employers may choose to employ permanent replacements
despite the effect this will have on their ability to contract with the federal
government during the labor dispute.'0 6 Once the labor dispute is resolved,
the employer will once again be free to contract with the government, even if
permanent replacements are still employed. Employers thus retain the right to
use permanent replacement workers.
The statutory provisions and Supreme Court decisions listed above
illustrate the give-and-take involved in the striker replacement doctrine.
Although the right to replace workers has been recognized for nearly sixty
years, it has been subject to limits. In considering the validity of the Order, the
Reich court ought to have recognized these limits. A fundamental problem with
the court's analysis in Reich is that it fails to explain how the limitations
imposed upon the striker replacement doctrine by the Order are inconsistent
with other existing limitations. The Reich decision, in fact, does not
acknowledge the existence of any limitations of the Mackay doctrine.
104. But see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426
(1989) (holding that employer could protect permanent replacements and less senior employees who worked
during strike from being bumped to less desirable work site by returning strikers with greater seniority
despite provision in collective bargaining agreement providing for bumping based on seniority).
105. See infra Part III.
106. Other commentators have suggested that employers may decide to forgo participation in
government contracts under the Order because of the value they place on using permanent replacements.
See, e.g., LeRoy, supra note 76, at 24-25; cf. supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing cases in
which courts have articulated view that no contractor has right to federal contract).
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II. THE UNPRECEDENTED EXPANSION OF THE MACHINISTS PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE
In addition to failing to acknowledge the limitations that have been placed
upon the Mackay doctrine and treating the Mackay dictum as if it were the
explicit text of the NLRA, the Reich court also adopted an expansive reading
of the Machinists preemption doctrine.'0 7 The Reich court relied heavily on
the Machinists doctrine, which prevents state or municipal governments from
passing legislation regulating areas that Congress, in passing the NLRA,
intended to be left unregulated.'08  This rigid application of
Machinists preemption by the court is of questionable validity for two reasons.
First, the Supreme Court in Belknap, Inc. i Hale'" limited the scope of
Machinists preemption. Second, the application of Machinists preemption to
the President of the United States is without precedent in labor law. While the
Supreme Court has limited the application of Machinists preemption, the D.C.
Circuit Court in Reich adopted an unprecedented expansion of the doctrine to
the executive. Such expansion is inconsistent with the development of the
Machinists doctrine.
A. Machinists Preemption Doctrine
The concept of preemption is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution." 0 The Machinists preemption doctrine is based upon the
interplay between the NLRA and the Supremacy Clause. Since the NLRA is
a federal statute, the Supremacy Clause dictates that it shall preempt any state
law that interferes with its functioning. Machinists preemption deals
specifically with state regulation of areas Congress intended to be left
unregulated, including the use of economic weapons during labor disputes."'
In Machinists, the Supreme Court struck down a cease and desist order
entered by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission against a union
and its members who had refused to work overtime during a labor dispute with
their employer." 2 In its decision, the Court noted that "Congress meant to
leave some activities unregulated and to be controlled by the free play of
107. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n. 427 U S
132 (1976).
108. See id.
109. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
110. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states: "This Constitution. and the Las of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made. or s% hich shall be madc.
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. ."Id.
111. See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149-51.
112. See id. at 155.
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economic forces."'" 3 The Court specifically included the parties' right to use
economic self-help weapons within this regulation-free zone."
4
B. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale
The Reich court noted that the use of permanent replacements was
specifically mentioned in Machinists as a weapon available to the employer to
counter the union's refusal to work overtime.' There was, however, no
reference to the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Belknap, Inc. v.
Hale,"16 in which the Court refused to apply the Machinists preemption
doctrine rigidly. In that case, Belknap, the employer, decided to replace its
striking employees permanently. Belknap made a number of assurances to the
replacement workers it hired that they were indeed "permanent.'17 Despite
these assurances, Belknap entered into a settlement agreement with the union
that included the reinstatement of the striking workers. Upon being displaced
by the returning strikers, a number of replacement employees brought actions
in state court against Belknap for misrepresentation and breach of contract. The
question of whether these actions in state court were preempted by the
Machinists doctrine was subsequently brought on appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court upheld the right of the displaced replacements to bring
suit in state court. In so doing, the Court rejected the employer's argument that
"[s]ubjecting the employer to costly suits for damages under state law for
entering into settlements calling for the return of strikers would ... conflict
with the federal labor policy favoring the settlement of labor disputes..' ' ..
Holding that the Machinists doctrine did not preempt the replacements' suit,
the Court stated: "If federal law forecloses this suit, more specific and
persuasive reasons than those based on Machinists must be identified to
support any such result."" 9 The Court thereby rejected a rigid adherence to
the Machinists preemption doctrine. By allowing displaced "permanent"
replacements to bring suit under state law against their employer, the Court
113. Id. at 144.
114. See id. at 147-48.
115. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1996). After finding that the
Machinists preemption doctrine precluded the State's interference with the union's use of an economic
weapon-the refusal to work overtime--the Court in Machinists mentioned, in dicta, economic weapons
to which the employer could have resorted to counter the union's actions. These included the use of a
lockout or permanent replacements. See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 152-53.
116. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
117. To retain replacement workers, Belknap placed an ad in a local newspaper that offered jobs to
"qualified persons looking for employment to permanently replace striking warehouse and maintenance
employees." Id. at 494 n.1. Upon accepting employment at Belknap, replacement employees signed a
contract that stated in part: "I as of this date have been employed by Belknap, Inc.... as a regular full
time permanent replacement ..... Id. at 494-95. During the course of the strike, Belknap distributed a
letter to replacements assuring them of their permanent status. See id. at 495.
118. Id. at 499.
119. Id. at 507.
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placed a limit upon an employer's ability to use permanent replacements as an
economic weapon.12 0 Employers cannot offer a "permanent" position to a
replacement without potentially being subject to sanction under state law
should they ultimately reinstate strikers at the replacement's expense.'
2'
The Belknap decision is not the sole example of the Court's reluctance to
invoke the Machinists preemption doctrine to invalidate state legislation in the
labor context. 22 In the face of preemption challenges, the Court has upheld
state statutes providing strikers with unemployment payments," 3 mandating
inclusion of minimum insurance benefits for employees in collective bargaining
agreements, 24 and requiring minimum severance benefits to employees who
lost their jobs due to plant closings.'2 Belknap is especially significant,
however, in that it allows private action under state law that ultimately
interferes with the employer's use of permanent replacements. The Belknap
decision represented such a definitive step away from a rigid application of the
Machinists doctrine that it inspired speculation as to the potential legitimacy
of future state legislation limiting economic weapons in labor disputes.' 6 It
is doubtful that the return with a vengeance of the Machinists doctrine in the
Reich decision could have been predicted.
C. Application of Machinists Preemption to the Erecutive Branch
By finding the Order to be preempted by the Machinists doctrine, the
Reich court not only ignored recent Court precedent that has refused to apply
this doctrine rigidly, but has also expanded it to the actions of the executive.
The Supreme Court has never used Machinists preemption to invalidate an
executive order. President George Bush issued two Executive Orders during
his term which, under the Reich analysis, would have been within the purview
of the Machinists preemption doctrine had they been challenged.'2 7 When
120. See id. at 536-38 (Brennan, J.. dissenting) (arguing that allowing suits by displaced replacements
will burden employers' right to use permanent replacements); cf. Moleski. supra note 70. at 311 ("By the
clear explication of replacements' rights in Belknap. unions now realize that the hirng weapon of the
employer will be used carefully, and quite possibly, sparingly. Employers will be required to weigh hirng
decisions at the beginning of a strike.").
121. The Belknap decision may have harmful repereussions for unions as well. Employers may become
very reluctant to agree to reinstate striking workers at the conclusion of the labor dispute for fear of
subjecting themselves to liability from replacement suits. See Belknap, 463 U.S. at 532 (Brennan. J..
dissenting).
122. See Gerald A. McDonough, Note, Federal Labor Law Preemption and Strikes: What Can State
and Local Governments Do?, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 117 (1990) (discussing recent cases that demonstrate
Court's unwillingness to apply Machinists preemption strictly).
123. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
124. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
125. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. I (1987).
126. See, e.g., MeDonough, supra note 122.
127. Executive Order 12,800 required all employers contracting with the federal government to post
conspicuous notice to its employees of their right not to be required to join or maintain membership in a
labor union. See 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992). Executive Order 12,818 was titled "Open Bidding on Federal
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these Executive Orders were brought to the court's attention in Reich, it
responded by noting the fact that neither was subject to litigation, and that,
therefore, no court had the opportunity to pass on their legality' 28 -a valid
point, but one which lent no precedential support to the court's decision to
strike down Clinton's Order.
In fact, the Reich court invalidated Clinton's Order after listing a host of
executive orders issued by previous Presidents "designed to ensure equal
employment opportunities" that, when challenged, were sustained by federal
appellate courts.129 The Reich court does not cite any example of an
executive order being struck down for conflicting with the NLRA.130 Despite
this lack of supporting precedent, the court invoked the Machinists doctrine to
strike down the Executive Order issued by the President of the United States.
The Reich court explained that: "Nor, as we have noted, is there any doubt
that Machinists 'pre-emption' applies to federal as well as state action."
13'
In support of this statement, the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Insurance Agents. 32 In Insurance Agents, the Court held that the
NLRB did not have the power to find a union's slow-down activities during
a labor dispute unlawful under the NLRA.
The Reich court extended the holdings of both Insurance Agents and
Machinists to stand for the proposition that preemption applies uniformly to
all federal action by any federal entity. A closer reading of Machinists,
however, shows that in enunciating its preemption doctrine, the Supreme Court
dealt specifically with the states and not with the executive branch. It stated:
and Federally Funded Projects" and barred government contractors from entering into pre-hire agreements
that were expressly permitted under the NLRA. See 57 Fed. Reg. 48,713 (1992).
128. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
129. See id. at 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (listing seven Executive Orders dealing with equal employment
opportunities upheld by U.S. appellate courts); see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO
v. Reagan, 870 F.2d 723 (upholding Executive Order excluding certain subdivisions of Marshal's Service
from coverage under Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act); American Fed'n of Labor &
Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding validity of Executive Order
imposing wage and price standards designed to combat inflation); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor,
442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971) (upholding equal employment Executive Order against NLRA-based challenge
as within presidential authority as conferred under Procurement Act); Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375
F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating Executive Order barring discrimination based upon national origin
"to be accorded the force and effect given to a statute enacted by Congress"); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 329 F.2d 3, 8 (3d Cir. 1964) (stating Executive Order and regulations promulgated thereunder designed
to prohibit federal contractors from racial discrimination have "full force of law").
130. This is unsurprising since the Machinists doctrine has never previously been used to strike down
an executive order.
131. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1334.
132. 361 U.S. 477, 499-500 (1960) (recognizing NLRB not authorized to "define through its processes
what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an 'ideal' or 'balanced' state of
collective bargaining"). Note that the Reich court cites Insurance Agents in support of its interpretation of
Machinists despite the fact that it was decided 16 years before Machinists. See Reich, 74 F3d at 1334.
Although it is cited within Machinists, it is not cited for the broad proposition of federal-federal preemption
espoused by the Reich court. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 141-43 (1976).
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Our decisions hold that Congress meant that these activities .. were
not to be regulable by States any more than by the NLRB, for neither
States nor the Board is "afforded flexibility in picking and choosing
which economic devices of labor and management shall be branded
as unlawful."'
' 33
Machinists specifically dealt with the preemption of a state activity intruding
upon the free zone of economic weaponry created by the NLRA. It analogized
a state's inability to regulate within this free zone with that of the NLRB."'
However, it did not apply principles of preemption to the executive branch.
The Reich court relied on the assumption that, if the NLRB is restricted
from interfering within this free zone, then other federal entities regulating
economic weapons during a labor dispute-specifically the executive branch
by way of issuing an executive order-must likewise be preempted.'" The
problem with this analysis is that it compares two federal entities-the
President and the NLRB-that serve quite different purposes. The NLRB is a
government agency designed specifically to enforce the NLRA. The President's
executive order authority, however, does not derive from the NLRA, nor was
it designed to serve or regulate the NLRA.3 6 Whereas NLRB decisions are
issued for the purpose of interpreting the NLRA, executive orders are not. An
NLRB decision that interferes with the free zone intended by Congress in
passing the NLRA is much different than an executive order issued for the
purpose of protecting the proprietary interest of the federal government. Thus,
a NLRB decision incongruous with the NLRA would have to be reversed by
a court, but an executive order requiring certain conditions to be met by those
parties contracting with the federal government need not be. Even if an
executive order were to be struck down, the Machinists preemption doctrine
is not the appropriate means by which to do so.
133. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149 (quoting Insurance Agents. 361 U.S. at 498)
134. See id. at 153 ("[S]tate attempts to influence the substantive terms of collective-bargaining
agreements are as inconsistent with the federal regulatory scheme as are such attempts by the
NLRB .... ").
135. Alternatively, the Reich court might be suggesting that actions a state takes that would be
preempted by the NLRA would also be preempted if taken by the President of the United States. This
theory, however, would be a gross contortion of the Supremacy Clause. which does not deal with
interaction among branches of the federal government. See U.S. CONsT. an. VI. cf. 2.
136. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs. v Kahn. 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Citr.
1979). In Kahn, the court upheld an executive order issued under the authority of the Procurement Act.
explaining:
[The Procurement Act] grants the President particularly direct and broad-ranging authority over
those larger administrative and management issues that involve the Government as a whole.
And that direct presidential authority should be used in order to achieve a flexible management
system capable of making sophisticated judgments in pursuit of economy and efficiency.
Id. at 789. Additionally, in ContractorsAss'n v. Secretary of Labor. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971). the court
stated, "Nothing in the National Labor Relations Act purports to place any limitation upon the contracting
power of the federal government," and held that "the President acted within his implied contracting
authority." Id. at 174.
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The Machinists preemption doctrine has never been used to invalidate an
executive order. It has almost exclusively been applied to state legislation.'37
By using the Machinists doctrine as a justification for striking down the Order,
the Reich court engaged in judicial overreaching. Perhaps if the Supreme Court
were in the process of expanding the application of the Machinists doctrine,
the Reich decision could be considered prescient. However, such action taken
in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has contracted the scope of
Machinists preemption appears, at best, inconsistent.
D. Policy Implications of Reich's Expansion of the Machinists Doctrine
The Reich court's expansion of the Machinists doctrine has profound
implications for the relationship among the branches of the federal government.
Most significantly, it distorts the Supremacy Clause in a manner that severely
restricts the President from acting through his legitimate executive order power
in the field of labor relations. As noted above, the Machinists doctrine is based
on the interplay between the Supremacy Clause and the NLRA. By relying
upon Machinists preemption to strike down the Order, the Reich court has
implicitly used the Supremacy Clause to invalidate the action of the President,
and thereby restrict the legitimate powers of the federal executive branch.
Policy decisions implemented by the President via an executive
order-including those dealing with labor or employment issues-have
customarily not been reviewed by the judiciary under preemption
doctrines. 38 Reviewing presidential policy decisions on such grounds ignores
the fact that the executive branch is a coequal with the legislative and judiciary
branches. By applying the Machinists preemption doctrine to the actions of the
executive, the court is treating such actions as akin to those of a state. Such
treatment does not acknowledge the right of the executive to contribute to
labor policy in areas undefined by the legislature. 39 As a coequal federal
branch, the executive cannot have its actions "preempted" by Congress,
especially in areas to which the legislature has never explicitly spoken.
137. The only exception to this mentioned in Reich is the Insurance Agents case which dealt with a
decision by the NLRB and was decided well before Machinists. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (citing cases upholding executive orders without
invoking preemption doctrines).
139. Recall that the right to replace workers permanently is grounded not within explicit statutory
language, but in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). As such, any
action dealing with this aspect of labor relations, including those by the executive branch or those by a
state, does not violate the will of the legislature. State activity in this area, however, could be considered
preempted by Machinists which held that a free zone of economic activity exists which Congress had
intended to be left unregulated, see Machinists, 427 U.S. at 144, because state action is subordinate to
federal action under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The Supremacy Clause, however, does not
subordinate the executive branch to the legislative branch or the judiciary. Thus, if the executive branch




The implications of this decision are even more substantial given that the
invalidated Order did not expressly contradict the terms of the NLRA, but
merely limited a judicial interpretation of it. Not only does Reich stand for the
proposition that an executive order affecting a congressional act is preempted,
it also means that the President does not possess the legal power to issue an
executive order limiting a judicial interpretation of a congressional act-even
when the scope of such an order is expressly limited and within the
government's proprietary interest.'
Reich has important implications for the concept of separation of powers
among the branches of the federal government. By striking down the Order,
the Reich court passed its judgment upon the political choice made by the
President. Undoubtedly, there were political motivations underlying the
President's decision to issue the Order. 4' However, implementing a political
policy is not per se an illegitimate action by the executive. The decision to
issue the Order was similar to the decisions to issue executive orders dealing
with equal employment opportunities-all were controversial actions with
political ramifications. Should the Order prove to be unpopular or
unrepresentative of the will of the American people, there are a number of
checks that could be used to limit or block its implementation. These include
congressional action preventing the Order's implementation, presidential
recognition that the Order was contrary to popular sentiment and subsequent
withdrawal of the Order, and political action in the form of angry voters
electing a challenger to the President who could then rescind the Order.
However, it is not the province of the judiciary to pass upon the legitimacy of
the political action of the President, especially when such action does not
contradict explicit statutory provisions of the NLRA and furthers the
proprietary interest of the federal government.
II. THE ORDER AND THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPRIETARY INTEREST
The Reich court held that, by issuing the Order, the government acted
impermissibly as a regulator. 42 However, the court sidestepped a substantial
amount of Supreme Court precedent that permits the government to take action
within its proprietary interest when interacting with private participants in the
marketplace.14 3 The court's contention that the government acted as a
regulator can be challenged for two reasons: the Order was limited in scope
140. See infra Part Ill.
141. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
142. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
143. See, e.g., Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors. Inc.. 507 U S
218, 227 (1993) ("When a State owns and manages property, for example. it must interact with pnvate
participants in the marketplace. In so doing, the State is not subject to pre-empuon by the NLRA. because
pre-emption doctrines apply only to state regulation.").
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to transactions to which the government is a party; and the Order addressed
legitimate proprietary interests of the government. This Part will briefly
address both of these justifications for the Order.
A. The Scope of the Order
The Order was issued "to ensure the economical and efficient
administration and completion of Federal Government contracts."'" By its
nature and scope, it is limited solely to contracts to which the government is
a party. It is important to note that the Order does not limit or regulate the use
of permanent replacements between private parties. It also does not outlaw
parties who are in a contractual relationship with the government from using
permanent replacements. These employers may still choose to use such
replacements should they decide that the potential loss of the government
contracts they hold during the period of the labor disputes is not outweighed
by the benefit of using permanent replacements.1
45
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 46 the
Supreme Court upheld an executive order issued by the Mayor of Boston that
required all construction projects financed with city funds to be performed by
a work force consisting of at least fifty percent Boston residents. In upholding
this order, the Court placed great significance on the fact that the scope of the
Mayor's order was limited to activities in which the city was a market
participant:
In this case, the Mayor's executive order covers a discrete, identifiable
class of economic activity in which the city is a major participant.
Everyone affected by the order is, in a substantial if informal sense,
"working for the city." Wherever the limits of the market participation
exception may lie, we conclude that the executive order in this case
falls well within the scope of [decisions made in support of a state's
activity as a market participant].'47
President Clinton's Order is limited in scope in much the same way as was the
Mayor's order in White. Corporations receiving federal contracts are, by
entering into the contract, working for the government. By applying solely to
government contracts, the Order is equivalent to the setting of a condition by
one party to the contract. It does not represent an attempt at regulation over
contracts between private, nongovernmental entities.
144. Exec. Order No. 12,594, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995).
145. See LeRoy, supra note 76, at 24-25; supra note 74 and accompanying text.
146. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
147. Id. at 211 n.7 (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)).
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B. The Interests Served by the Order
1. Government as Proprietor
In Boston Harbor,48 the Supreme Court held that there is a "distinction
between government as regulator and government as proprietor."' 49 Although
the Machinists preemption doctrine precludes state and municipal regulation
in areas that Congress intended to leave unregulated,' 5° it does not preclude
state activity as a market participant. Assuming arguendo that Machinists
preemption applies to an executive order,'S5 actions taken by the government
as a market participant would not be subject to this preemption.'"
In Boston Harbor, the Court was presented with state activity affecting
labor negotiations. The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA),
an agency of the Massachusetts State government, hired Kaiser Engineers, Inc.,
as a project manager. Kaiser Engineers was responsible for negotiating a long-
term contract with the Building and Construction Trades Council (BCTC) for
the cleanup of Boston Harbor. 53 Kaiser Engineering suggested to the
MWRA that it negotiate an agreement with BCTC that would "'assure labor
stability over the life of the project."'" MWRA agreed with this suggestion,
and Kaiser Engineering negotiated an agreement with the BCTC that included
a union security provision, a ten year no-strike agreement, and a requirement
that all construction contractors and subcontractors working on the project be
bound by these terms. 55 Despite the fact that union security agreements and
no-strike provisions are issues normally left to negotiations between the
employer and the union, 56 the Court upheld the contract negotiated by
MWRA, which included these terms. It concluded that the state had acted as
a market participant, not as a regulator, in creating contractual terms designed
to promote labor peace.
57
148. Building & Constr. Trades Council %v. Associated Builders & Contractors. Inc.. 507 US. 218
(1993).
149. Id. at 227.
150. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 614 (1986)
151. But see supra Section IL.C (arguing that extension ofMachimsts preemption doctrne to executive
branch of federal government is unprecedented).
152. See Building & Constr. Trades Council, 507 U.S. at 229-30: Henry H. Drummonds. The Sister
Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American
Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 574 (1993); Wilson Mcl..eod. Rekindling Labor Law Successorship
in an Era of Decline, II HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 271, 346 (1994).
153. The cleanup of the Harbor was expected to cost $6.1 billion over 10 years. See id. at 221.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 221-22. Although union security clauses are generally illegal under the NLRA. a
specific exception is made for the construction industry. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1994).
156. In Golden State Transit Corp. it City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986). the Court specifically
stated: "States are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restmctions on economic weapons of self-
help, such as strikes or lockouts .... "Id. at 614-15 (emphasis added).
157. See Building & Constr. Trades Council, 507 U.S. at 230-33.
19961
The Yale Law Journal
There are many ways in which the Boston Harbor agreement and the
Order are similar. Most importantly, both involve a governmental entity
imposing a contractual term upon private parties. In Boston Harbor, the
agreement negotiated between the MWRA and BCTC imposed the "labor
peace" requirements not only upon the party directly engaged in negotiations
with the government-the BCTC-but also upon every private subcontractor
that was a part of the Boston Harbor cleanup project and their employees. The
relevant part of the bid specification stated:
"[E]ach successful bidder and any and all levels of subcontractors, as
a condition of being awarded a contract or subcontract, will agree to
abide by the provisions of the Boston Harbor Wastewater Treatment
Facilities Project Labor Agreement as executed ... on behalf of
[MWRA] and [BCTC] ... and will be bound by the provisions of
that agreement in the same manner as any other provision of the
contract."'
158
Thus the Boston Harbor decision allows the government, when acting as
proprietor, to impose contractual conditions upon parties not directly
contracting with the government and upon employees not working directly for
the government. In a similar manner, the Order imposes a requirement on those
contracting with the federal government that does not involve the imposition
of a contractual term between the government and the contractors, but between
the contractors and their employees.
Under this framework, the Order clearly falls within the proprietary
interest category as defined in Boston Harbor. The Order creates conditions
that must be met by those contracting with the government. The condition that
it requires-that parties with which the federal government contracts not use
permanent replacements-could be justified on the basis that it promotes labor
peace. 59 This is the same justification given for the agreement between
MWRA and BCTC which was upheld in Boston Harbor '
60
The most significant difference between Boston Harbor and the Order
involves the scope of the Order's application. In Boston Harbor, the Court
noted that "the challenged action in this litigation was specifically tailored to
one particular job, the Boston Harbor cleanup project."' 6 ' The Order, by
contrast, applies to all those contracting with the federal government, and is
158. Id. at 222 (quoting MWRA Bid Specification 13.1).
159. See infra Subsections IV.B.2.a-b (discussing how use of permanent replacements during labor
dispute leads to longer and more violent strikes).
160. See Building & Constr Trades Council, 507 U.S. at 221 (discussing MWRA's "development of
a labor-relations policy that would maintain worksite harmony, labor-management peace, and overall
stability throughout the duration of the project").
161. Id. at 232.
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not limited to a specific project. In Reich, the court noted this distinction and
opined: "Surely, the result would have been entirely different, given the
Court's reasoning, if Massachusetts had passed a general law or the Governor
had issued an executive order requiring all construction contractors doing
business with the state to enter into collective bargaining agreements
[containing the Boston Harbor clause].' 62 Such a distinction, however, loses
force as a justification for invalidating the Order considering that previous
executive orders that imposed equal employment requirements upon all those
contracting with the federal government were upheld by the judiciary, despite
their broad application.
63
In addition, it is important to note the Order's discretionary elements and
limitations on its scope.'6 As noted above, debarment under the Order is
explicitly limited to the length of the labor dispute, and the resolution of such
labor disputes need not include the rehiring of striking workers or the dismissal
of replacements. 65 In addition, the Order provides a process by which
federal government contractors can contest debarment and allows the head of
the government agency contracting with an employer using permanent
replacements to object to the debarment of that employer.'6 While these
elements of the Order do not change the fact that its application extends to
more than just one discrete project as did the agreement in Boston Harbor, it
does show that the Clinton Administration considered the fact that the Order
had a broader application, and it took steps to limit potential harms. The Reich
court assumed that the Order's broader application necessarily means that the
Order is regulatory rather than proprietary. Using this logic, however, the court
would allow an executive order to be promulgated upon the award of each
individual federal contract requiring that an employer not use permanent
replacements during a labor dispute, but the court would not (and did not)
allow the Order to stand because it combined all of these permissible orders.
Although there are potential problems with issuing one order that would cover
a number of contracting relationships, including the potential for its application
in a specific case in which it should not have been applied, the Order allows
for contract-specific exceptions and enables both government agencies and the
contracting party to initiate a review process if they believe the debarment
should not be pursued in a specific case.'67
162. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich. 74 F.3d 1322. 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
163. See Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971). supra note 129
164. See supra Section I.B.
165. See supra Subsection I.B.I.
166. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
167. See Permanent Replacement of Lawfully Stnking Employees. 60 Fed Reg 27.856. at 27.861
(1995); supra Section I.B.
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2. The Defensible Nexus
One reason given by the Reich court for striking down the Order was the
lack of a nexus connecting the Order with its stated goal of efficient
completion of government contracts. 68 Although the Reich court claimed to
be "quite reluctant to consider the President's motivation in issuing the
Executive Order,"'169 it nevertheless went on to compare the federal
government's proprietary interest to that of a private contractor, and questioned
why "so long as the goods or services contracted for were provided in a timely
fashion and met quality standards," the government would be concerned about
whether or not the employer was using permanent replacements.1
70
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,"' the Supreme Court upheld a
Maryland statute in which the State paid a bounty to persons who "scrapped"
inoperable automobiles, despite the fact that the statute imposed more onerous
documentation procedures on out-of-state residents who attempted to collect
this bounty. In upholding this statute as a legitimate action by the State as a
market participant, the Court stated that, "a statutory classification impinging
upon no fundamental interest, and especially one dealing only with economic
matters, need not be drawn so as to fit with precision the legitimate purposes
animating it.' ' t 72 By arguing that the typical contractor would not be
concerned with whether or not an employer used permanent replacements, the
Reich court is doing precisely what the Supreme Court refused to do in
Hughes-invalidating a statute (or, in this case, the Order) because, in the view
of the court, there was not a precise fit between the government's proprietary
interest and the use of permanent replacements by firms contracting with the
federal government. Simply put, the court subjected the stated justification of
the Order to a high level of scrutiny, requiring an exact fit between the stated
justification for the Order and its purpose.
Had the court correctly applied Hughes, it would have found a sufficient
basis justifying a correlation between restricting a firm's use of permanent
replacements and the proprietary interest of the federal government. "' The
168. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
169. Id. at 1335.
170. Id. at 1336.
171. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
172. Id. at 813 (declining to hold statute unconstitutional even though it could have been drawn "more
artfully, more directly, or more completely"); see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277
(1988) (stating that state's market participant activities are "of no greater constitutional concern than those
of a private business").
173. The concepts of economy and efficiency stated in the Procurement Act upon which the executive
order authority is based have been broadly defined by reviewing courts. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Labor
& Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. Kahn, 618 E2d 784, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[The Procurement Act]
recognizes that the Government generally must have some flexibility to seek the greatest advantage in
various situations. 'Economy' and 'efficiency' are not narrow terms; they encompass those factors like




court chose to judge the Order based on a "typicality" standard in which it
asked whether the government's desire not to contract with firms using
permanent replacements would be considered typical behavior of private
contractors acting in their economic self-interest.17 Although the court
decided that the "typical" contractor would be unconcerned with whether or
not the firms with which they contract hire permanent replacements, this
conclusion is unpersuasive. The court ignored the stated justification of the
Order, namely that employers' use of permanent replacements results in longer
lasting and more contentious strikes than those in which permanent
replacements are not used-a justification supported by recent empirical
studies.'75 Because the Order targets activity that results in labor unrest, and
because promoting "labor-management peace, and overall stability" was
identified by the Court in Boston Harbor as a proper proprietary goal,' 76 the
Order does have a defensible nexus with a governmental proprietary interest.
More importantly, the fact that the use of permanent replacements has some
correlation to lengthy and contentious strikes refutes the court's typicality
analysis. Private contractors would undoubtedly have an interest in stability
and consistency, characteristics that are often absent from firms engaged in a
contentious labor dispute. Those contracting with a struck employer are subject
to potential delays in the shipment of goods, quality defects resulting from the
work of lesser-trained replacements, and even unlawful and violent interference
from strikers.
a. Strike Duration
One assertion made by the Order was that "'the use of permanent
replacements can change a limited dispute into a broader, more contentious
struggle, thereby exacerbating the problems that initially led to the strike."'"n
A recent study has determined that the mean duration of strikes in which
permanent replacements were used is three times longer than those in which
they were not used, and that strikes during which the employer merely
threatened to use permanent replacements are on average twice as long as
strikes during which no such threat was made.' The Order made note of
this fact.
79
174. See Reich, 74 F.3d at 1336-37.
175. See, e.g., LeRoy, supra note 3. at 844 (violence); Schnell & Gramm. supra note I1. passtm
(longer strikes).
176. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors. Inc .507 U S 218. 221
(1993).
177. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13.023 (1995).
178. See Schnell & Gramm, supra note II, at 194; cf. Canzonen. supra note 19. at 235-36 (noting
"devastating effect" that employer's threat to use permanent replacements has on union's bargaining
leverage).
179. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. at 13.023 (It has been found that stikes involving
permanent replacement workers are longer in duration than other strikes.-).
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Although studies have shown a correlation between the permanent
replacement of workers and extended strike duration, this may not prove that
use of the permanent replacements is the cause of a longer strike. Specifically,
the contentious nature of the strike might lead to the use of permanent
replacements, rather than the reverse. However, there is no reason for the court
to believe that the "typical" contractor would accept this alternative hypothesis
rather than the one embraced by the Order. In fact, there is a compelling
reason to believe that the "typical" contractor would be concerned that using
permanent replacements causes longer disputes. Once the decision is made to
use permanent replacements, an employer greatly increases the distance
between its position and that of the union. The permanent replacement issue
is added to the issue(s) that initially led to the strike and creates a compelling
need for the union to negotiate on a new subject: the eventual reinstatement of
its workers. 80 Additionally, Belknap makes employers, once they offer
permanent positions to replacements, reluctant to agree to a striking union's
condition that its members be reinstated at the conclusion of the labor
dispute.' 8' Thus, by using permanent replacements, the employer arguably
ties its own handsand increases the rift between the two parties. As a result,
those contracting with the employer are forced to deal with delays, quality
concerns, and other strike-related issues for a longer period of time.
b. Strike Violence
As previously noted, one of the justifications given by the President for
issuing the Order was that "the use of permanent replacements can change a
limited dispute into a broader, more contentious struggle."'' 8 2 A number of
commentators have noted that, because the replacements represent a threat to
the strikers' livelihood, and due to the proximity of the replacements and
strikers during a labor dispute,8 3 violence often results.' 4 However, just
as it ignored the strike duration justification, the Reich court did not
acknowledge the "contentious struggle" justification offered by the President.
180. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426,
437 (1989) (describing "exacerbated" differences and "poststrike resentments" resulting from employer's
use of permanent replacements); Diane Bruce & Tara Ann Koenig, Confusion Surrounding the Good Faith
Doubt Evidentiary Standard Goes Unchecked: NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 6 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 93, 113-14 (1990) (discussing strike in which all issues upon which strike had been
based were resolved, but strike continued because of unresolved issue of status of striker replacements).
181. See Belknap, Inc, v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983); supra Section II.B.
182. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. at 13,023.
183. Replacements typically must cross strikers' picket lines in order to get to work.
184. See Wilson, supra note 67, at 666; see also Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial
Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803, 1868 (1993) ("Strikers have
traditionally been willing to use violence to prevent others from taking their jobs."); Norman H. Klrshman
& Robert Zentz, Striker Replacements: The Law, the Myths, the Realities, NEv. LAw., Jan. 1995, at 20. 21
(stating that employer's announcement of intent to hire permanent replacements "often escalates a peaceful,
manageable labor dispute[] to one earmarked by violence").
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Again, that is not to say that this justification could not be subject to the same
causation argument as the strike duration justification-namely that it is the
contentious nature of the strike that causes an employer to hire permanent
replacements, and it is the contentious nature of the strike rather than the use
of permanent replacements that leads to violence. However, even corporate
managers, when deciding whether or not to hire permanent replacements,
consider the fact that a decision to do so will often lead to strike violence.'
&s
Union leaders also acknowledge that the hiring of replacements leads to
violence by striking workers. When questioned during a 1993 labor dispute,
United Mine Workers President Richard Trumka stated: "I think you'd have
to be very naive to believe if [the employer] tried to bring these scabs that
there won't be some of that [violence] somewhere .... And it won't be
because we don't try to stop it."' 6 Other union leaders have been more
explicit in expressing the connection between the decision to resort to violence
and an employer's decision to hire replacements. In a 1993 article on the
Workplace Fairness Act, it was reported that Rodney Trump, the President of
a United Auto Workers local union, "was so worried about replacements that
he bought baseball bats. He said he would have issued them to pickets if any
replacements had tried to cross the picket line.
" 187
Again, it is doubtful that the "typical" contractor would not be concerned
with the prospect of contracting with a firm using permanent replacements,
considering the spillover of violence that accompanies such action during labor
disputes. Two prominent examples are illustrative. From 1985 to 1986, union
workers went on strike at the Austin, Minnesota plant of the Hormel Company.
When Hormel's management decided to reopen the plant using permanent
replacement workers, the violence was so severe that Minnesota Governor
Rudy Perpich called out the National Guard.' When the National Guard
was withdrawn, the ensuing vandalism and violence prompted the local sheriff
to describe the situation as '"mob rule."" 9 The extent of this unrest and
accompanying violence led the Minnesota legislature to pass the Picket Line
Peace Act,' 90 which made it illegal for employers to hire permanent
replacements.' 9' Similarly, violence resulted when Greyhound Lines, Inc.
decided to hire 3000 permanent replacements workers in response to a strike
lasting from 1990 to 1993. Fifty-two sniper attacks were made against
185. See Donald T. O'Connor, Editorial, Manager's Journal: Nothing Fair About Striker 'Fairness'
Act, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1993, at Al I (noting employer's fear of strike violence wlhen constdenng use
of permanent replacements).
186. See Violence Likely if Strikers Replaced, UMW Chief Says. Pr. WORTH STAR.TELEORAM. Sept.
3, 1993, at 3.
187. See Kim Clark, Business. Unions Disagree on Strike Bill. BALTIMORE SUN., June 18. 1993, at
12D.
188. See LeRoy, supra note 3, at 844.
189. Id. at 855.
190. See id. at 844-45.
191. See id. at 858.
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Greyhound buses driven by replacement workers, resulting in a significant
decrease in customer demand and replacement willingness to cover many
routes. 92 Shortly after the strike began, Greyhound filed for bankruptcy.'93
The Hormel and Greyhound examples illustrate how violence precipitated
by an employer's decision to hire permanent replacements can affect the ability
of the struck business to provide goods and services on a timely basis. 94 Just
as strike violence significantly impaired Greyhound's ability to provide its bus
service to customers on certain routes, so could a firm contracting with the
federal government be impaired from delivering goods or services. Even the
typical private contractor would be concerned with the effects of strike
violence on a firm's ability to deliver contracted for goods and services. The
Reich court never considered how even those goals that it lists as of paramount
concern to the typical contractor-timely deliveries and quality
standards' 95-are affected by a contracting partner's decision to hire
permanent replacements. Spillover effects of strike violence are an example of
why a typical contractor might legitimately be concerned about contracting
with a firm utilizing permanent replacements during the course of a labor
dispute.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit engaged in judicial overreaching in striking down Executive
Order 12,954. The court justified this action by treating Mackay dictum as
explicit NLRA text. It improperly characterized the Order as a prohibited
repeal by implication, failed to consider thoroughly specific terms of the Order
that were consistent with an employer's right to use permanent replacements,
and never acknowledged existing limitations on the right to use permanent
replacements that have been expounded by both the Supreme Court and
Congress.
192. See Bovard, supra note 1; Randall Samborn, 'Replacements' Spur Labor Action, NAT'L L.J., May
28, 1990, at 1.
193. See Corbett, supra note 66, at 849-50.
194. For other examples of violence provoked by an employer's decision to hire permanent
replacements, see LeRoy, supra note 76, at 25-26. One notable example is the Bridgestone/Firestone strike
in 1994, during which an employer's contemplation of making temporary replacements permanent allegedly
was accompanied by the bombing of a replacement's home, the impaling of a striker with a tire iron, and
the smashing of a replacement worker's car windshield with a baseball bat. See id. at 25 n.136. At a
meatpackers strike in Grayson, Kentucky, in which permanent replacements were used, strike violence
included shots fired at strikers in the union headquarters and a striker's driving replacement workers off
the road. See id. at 26 n.144. When discussing the less well-known incident of replacement-motivatcd
violence in Kentucky, LeRoy states: "This kind of strike, while failing to attract national attention because
large numbers of workers, big-name employers, and trendy issues have not been involved, nevertheless
typifies the intense divisiveness that communities experience when permanent replacements cross hostile
picket lines." Id.
195. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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The court also adopted an expansive interpretation of the Machinists
preemption doctrine that could significantly alter the balance of power among
the federal branches of government. By applying the Machinists doctrine to an
executive order, the court opened the door for expansive judicial review of any
executive order involving labor-management relations. Any presidential
decision that affects labor relations undeniably will possess a political element,
especially decisions dealing with highly controversial issues such as permanent
striker replacements. 196 The policy adopted should properly be subject to
political, rather than judicial, restraints. Had President Clinton's Order proved
to be contrary to popular political sentiment, a number of checks could have
been executed so as to limit or prohibit its implementation. First, Congress
could have taken action by passing legislation barring enforcement of the
Order.197 Second, Clinton could have decided that the Order lacked political
support and rescinded it himself. Third, the President could have been voted
out of office and his successor could have rescinded the Order. After becoming
President, Clinton took analogous action when rescinding executive orders
issued by President Bush not only regarding labor relations, but also in other
politically charged areas such as abortion.'9
These possible responses to an unpopular executive order dealing with
labor relations have one common characteristic: they are all subject to political
checks. By expanding the Machinists doctrine, the Reich court has injected an
element of judicial review where it had not previously existed. Reich
empowers the politically unaccountable federal judiciary to review politically
charged policy decisions of the President. Even more striking is the fact that
Machinists had never before been used to invalidate an executive order; it had
been applied solely to state regulations and NLRB decisions regarding state
regulations.'" Additionally, the D.C. Circuit Court, by expanding the
Machinists doctrine as it did in Reich, moved in a direction diametrically
opposed to that of Supreme Court decisions limiting the application of
Machinists preemption.
The court's decision in Reich has important repercussions upon the ability
of the federal government to act as a market participant. The precedent
established by the Supreme Court, culminating with Boston Harbor, explicitly
196. See Leibold, supra note 24, at 152 (noting Republican partisan opposition to Order), Noman.
supra note 10 (same).
197. In fact, such action was attempted by the House and the Senate Appropriations Committee in an
effort to prevent enforcement of the Order. See David Rogers. GOP's $13 Billion Spendtng-Cut Bill Arms
for Compromise with President, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27. 1995. at A6; David Rogers. Senate Panel Restores
Funds Cut by House, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18. 1995, at A4. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich's announcement
of President Clinton's intent to issue the Order spurred efforts in Congress to present funding for its
development and enforcement predating its actual issuance by the President. See Lerbold. supra note 24.
at 153.
198. See Ruth Marcus, At Issue: Abortion, WASH. POST. Aug. 16. 1992. at A2 1. Planning for the
Abortion Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1993. at A20.
199. See supra Part II.
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permits government action in its role as a market participant in areas affecting
labor relations. Reich represents a significant departure from this precedent.
The Reich decision, if not overturned, could eventually be interpreted as a flat
prohibition on any and all government activity dealing with labor issues
previously left unregulated by Congress. As a result, the federal government
could find itself impotent to protect its proprietary interests effectively through
the use of no-strike provisions, union security clauses (in contracts involving
the construction trades), and other contractual terms designed to deter lengthy
labor disputes. Alternatively, Reich provides justification for substantial judicial
review of the means by which the government chooses to protect its
proprietary interest. The role of the judiciary would be expanded to include
judgments of both policy and legality. Such a dual role is troubling as it gives
the politically unaccountable judiciary the power to strike down legal policy
decisions of the executive, even solely on the basis of political differences with
the elected executive.e °
In striking down the Order, the Reich court opened the door for significant
review of political policy by the federal courts. The Order represented a policy
choice by the Clinton Administration regarding the means by which it would
protect the proprietary interests of the federal government. Although, as with
any policy decision, the Order had a political dimension, it was a legally
justifiable action. The ultimate fate of this Order rightfully rested with the
politically accountable executive or legislature, not with the politically
unaccountable judiciary.
200. The constitutional ramifications of the federal judiciary's willingness to decide matters of policy
have not gone unnoticed. As one commentator has noted, "It is the judiciary's assumption of power not
rightfully its own that has weakened, indeed severely damaged, the constitutional structure of the nation."
ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 115 (1996).
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